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We present a model where groups attempt to exert inﬂuence on policies using both
bribes (plata, Spanish for silver) and the threat of punishment (plomo, Spanish for
lead). We then use it to make predictions about the quality of a country’s public
oﬃcials and to understand the role of institutions granting politicians with immunity
from legal prosecution. The use of punishment lowers the returns from public oﬃce
and reduces the incentives of high ability citizens to enter public life. Cheaper plomo
and more resources subject to oﬃcial discretion are associated with more frequent
corruption and less able politicians. Moreover, the possibility of punishment changes
t h en a t u r eo ft h ei n ﬂuence game, so that even cheaper plata can lower the ability
of public oﬃcials. Protecting oﬃcials from accusations of corruption (immunity) will
decrease the frequency of corruption and may increase the quality of politicians if the
judiciary is weak. These predictions are the opposite to those emerging from a model
where only bribes are used.
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1The positive evils and dangers of the representative, as of every other form of
government, may be reduced to two heads: ﬁrst, general ignorance and incapacity,
or, to speak more moderately, insuﬃcient mental qualiﬁcations, in the controlling
body; secondly, the danger of its being under the inﬂuence of interests not identical
with the general welfare of the community.
John Stuart Mill1
1 Introduction
During their ﬁrst week in oﬃce, Colombian judges and other public oﬃc i a l si n v o l v e di nt h e
anti-drugs war often receive a message asking,
“Plata o plomo?”
The message originates in the drug cartels and is Spanish for “ S i l v e ro rl e a d ? ” .I tr e m i n d s
public oﬃcials that there is an alternative to ﬁghting drugs and receiving plomo (Spanish for
lead, as in bullets) which is to not ﬁght drugs and receive plata (Spanish for silver or money, as
in a bribe). Bowden (2001) writes about the ways of the former head of the Medellin Cartel,
Pablo Escobar Gaviría: “Pablo was establishing a pattern of dealing with the authorities...It
soon became known simply as plata o plomo. One either accepted Pablo’s plata (silver) or
his plomo (lead)...Death was his strategy against extradition, that and money. His policy of
plata o plomo became so notoriously eﬀective that it would ultimately threaten to undermine
Colombia’s democracy...Pablo’s primary target...was the country’s judicial system, to which
he oﬀered plata o plomo....Plata o plomo had every oﬃcial in Bogotá living in fear or under
suspicion...” The phenomenon is well documented and exceeds the case of the Medellin
Cartel.2
In this paper we present a model built upon the assumption that groups have access to
both carrots (plata) and sticks (plomo). A basic result of the paper is that an active pressure
group may want to use both instruments, as the use of threats saves on bribes. Our root
assumption has many advantages. First, it is more realistic than previous approaches, as
there is overwhelming evidence that, in practice, pressure groups use both types of instru-
ments. Second, the assumption is less restrictive from a theoretical perspective than allowing
groups to use only bribes or punishment. Third, a model built upon this assumption allows
us to analyze the two “positive evils and dangers of the representative” emphasized by Mills
1“Considerations on Representative Government” (1861), in “On Liberty and Other Essays” (1998),
Oxford World’s Classics, Oxford: Oxford University Press, page 286. Cited in Mueller (1989).
2Variants of the P l a t aoP l o m ophenomenon have been observed in various countries where drugs maﬁas
operate: “Plata o plomo. Silver or lead. That is the choice drug traﬃckers in Mexico have given their allies
and enemies for years: the bribe or the bullet” (Los Angeles Times, December 12 1999).
2in the quote above: that the representative is inﬂuenced by special interests, and that the
members of the representative are of insuﬃcient mental quality. In fact our model explains
how the two dangers are linked together through the “plata o plomo”m e t h o do fi n ﬂuence.
Finally, the approach is easily testable as a number of the predictions that emerge are in
sharp contrast to those made by the traditional approach where groups can only use bribes
or campaign contributions.3 We focus on the quality of public oﬃcials and the value of a
class of institutions designed to make policymakers less accountable, such as legal immunity.
The contrast with the traditional approach is worth emphasizing. For example, the
assumption that groups have access to both plata and plomo results in the ﬁrst model that
can explain a negative relationship between the level of state capture and measures of the
quality of politicians. In the traditional approach, more capture is obtained through more
bribes, which in turn makes public life more attractive for the more able individuals in
society. In our model, more capture may be the result of threats becoming cheaper to use,
as when violence becomes more widespread. In this case, returns to entering public life fall
and only the relatively less able will want to run for oﬃce. Interestingly, even when it is
the traditional instrument of inﬂuence (bribes) which becomes cheaper to use, society might
end up with worse politicians. This is the opposite to what one ﬁn d si naw o r l dw h e r e
only bribes are used, and shows that including threats changes the nature of the inﬂuence
game. In addition, a model where groups use only bribes could never explain why countries
may want to provide public oﬃcials with some form of legal immunity. A famous example
is the granting of immunity from legal prosecution to France’s President, Jacques Chirac,
in 2000.4 Such an institution, which makes it more diﬃcult to investigate the actions of
oﬃcials, could only make sense in a world where threats of legal harassment are used to
inﬂuence policy. Our model explains this institution quite naturally, and how its usefulness
is related to the quality of other judicial institutions in the country. Finally, we predict that
the amount of resources under political discretion may be negatively correlated with the
quality of politicians. In the traditional approach, more resources under political discretion
result in more bribes, which in turn make public life more attractive. In our model, more
resources under political discretion result in more threats, which makes public oﬃce less
attractive for high ability types.
Since threats are used by active pressure groups, this model oﬀers a new perspective on the
eﬃciency costs of inﬂuence activities (see, for example, Becker, 1983). In contrast to a bribe,
which can be considered just a transfer, punishment involves dead weight losses, particularly
3See Stigler (1971), Peltzman (1976), Baron (1989), Grossman and Helpman (1994), inter alia.
4A French court ruled that President Jacques Chirac cannot be investigated while in oﬃce in connection
with a corruption scandal. See, for example, “Court upholds Chirac’s immunity”, BBC News,T u e s d a y ,1 1
January, 2000.
3when it involves the physical destruction of resources for which the group gains nothing
directly. More importantly, however, our paper emphasizes another channel through which
inﬂuence activities can induce eﬃciency losses, namely that it could reduce the equilibrium
ability of public oﬃcials. Although the pressure group only intends to change the policy
decisions of the oﬃcials, the expected payoﬀs of the latter are reduced by the use of threats
so that able candidates will be less likely to enter political careers.5 Caselli and Morelli
(2001) is one of the few models that can explain cross-country diﬀerences in the quality of
politicians.6 They show that bad politicians may want to keep their own wages low so that
society may get to be supply-constrained of high quality politicians. Since bribe-oﬀers is
the technology used for inﬂuence, however, the natural outcome in this model is that the
quality of politicians increases when there is more capture, if not in terms of honesty, at least
in terms of ability.7 Explaining the quality of oﬃcials is important because it is a simple
explanation for cross-country income diﬀerences. Our explanation is that poor countries
end up poor because their political elites choose bad policies, and that this is so because
in equilibrium policies get to be chosen by politicians of “insuﬃcient mental qualiﬁcations”
(to speak moderately). This is particularly appealing because, as Caselli and Morelli (2001)
emphasize, the quality of political elites varies greatly across countries.8
The violent aspect of the “Plata o plomo?” quote may suggest that we are referring to a
(big) problem in a small number of countries.9 But the natural assumption is that pressure
groups have access to a number of threat “technologies” that allow groups to exert pressure
reducing the utility of policymakers, without necessarily taking them to (presumably) minus
5For other roles of threats, see section 2 below.
6They introduce the term “bad politicians”. Using the representative democracy setup as developed by
Osborne and Slivinski (1996) and Besley and Coate (1997), it can be shown that our model can be applied
to both elected oﬃcials and to bureaucrats. Thus, except when otherwise noted, we use the two categories
interchangeably.
7The connection between bribes in the public sector and a higher quality of applicants was already present
in the early work on rent seeking. In fact, Krueger (1974) argues that when the system distributes more rents,
and there are more bribes to be shared, an excess supply of candidates for the bureaucracy may appear so
that some form of rationing will be required. Her concern was that if rationing is done following educational
attainment, competition may lead to waste. A related point is raised by Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1991),
who show that when rent seeking is important, the more talented people will choose the bureaucracy over
the private sector. Since the private sector drives growth, this is particularly costly.
8An existing literature studies how bad policies can come about (see, for example, Weingast, Shepsle and
Johnsen, 1981; and Coate and Morris, 1995) and on how good policies may not be introduced as soon as
they should (see, for example, Alesina and Drazen, 1991; Fernandez and Rodrik, 1991; and Dal Bó and Di
Tella, 1999). The explanations in this literature hold for societies where the quality of politicians is taken
as given.
9Note that violence is the norm rather than the exception. There are 30 OECD countries with relatively
secure environments (but see Mexico, Turkey and Italy’s south) and 189 member states in the United Nations.
4inﬁnity through death. Indeed, politicians in less violent countries often make a point related
to P l a t aop l o m o ? when they claim that their own actions are constrained by the inﬂuence
of pressure groups. The type of complaint voiced by politicians suggests that punishments
include smear campaigns in the media and legal harassment in countries with weak judicial
institutions. Examples are provided in Section 2. Interestingly, the existing literature on
interest groups cannot explain such complaints. If groups only oﬀer bribes, and accepting
bribes is always optional, the complaints raised by politicians would not be believed by
anyone. Thus, our analysis is close to Dal Bó and Di Tella (1999), who study how pressure
aﬀects policy formation in a model where policymakers are honest and groups only have
access to threats. The analysis there, as well as in this paper, is developed in the context
of government oﬃcials under pressure, but the analysis is readily applied to other contexts.
Baron (2001) develops a related idea in his model of private politics and corporate social
responsibility. He considers an activist who has access to a class of threats (including boycotts
and ﬁling lawsuits) in attempting to inﬂuence the ﬁrm’s strategy. The extension to a prior
entry stage along the lines of our model could be empirically important, particularly when
the media plays a role in developing threats.10 The work on legal origins by Glaeser and
Shleifer (2002) has also emphasized the possibility that groups use threats to aﬀect judges,
and that diﬀerences in the intensity of pressure determined the form of legal organization
that emerged over time in England and France. To our knowledge, our paper is the ﬁrst
attempt at extending the basic model of endogenous policy formation to include pressure
groups that optimally use both bribes and threats simultaneously.11
The plan for the paper is as follows. Section 2 discusses some examples while section 3
introduces the model. It has two stages: an entry stage, where individuals of diﬀerent ability
decide if they want work in the public or in the private sector, and a pressure stage, where
a pressure group tries to inﬂuence the decisions of a public oﬃcial. In section 4 we analyze
the benchmark case where the pressure group only has access to a bribe technology.
Section 5 studies the case of groups that have access to both bribe and punishment
technologies and derives the main empirical predictions. Section 6 applies the model to
explain when granting oﬃc i a li m m u n i t yc a nc u r bc o r r u p t i o na n dw h e ni tc a ni m p r o v et h e
quality of politicians. Section 7 oﬀers some further results. The ﬁrst concerns the connection
10The possibility that talented CEO’s would fail to apply for the top jobs at times when shareholder
activism—and media scrutiny—is intense, is discussed in the article “No Thanks: Fearing Scandals, Executives
Spurn CEO Job Oﬀers”, page 1, The Wall Street Journal, June 27, 2002. Dyck and Zingales (2002) show that
the media can play a role in pressuring corporate managers in behaving in ways that are socially desirable
and that may not coincide with shareholder value maximization. See also Dyck (2002).
11Compare our setting with an armed robbery. In the latter, the thief says “You, give me the money,
otherwise I will harm you”. In our setting, the group says “I will give you the money (and you give me a
favorable policy), otherwise I will harm you”.
5between the amount of discretion oﬃcials enjoy, with the equilibrium amount of corruption
and the quality of politicians. Then we extend the model to analyze the possibility of
multiple equilibria when the incompetence of politicians reinforces the conditions that make
their emergence more likely. An extension where threats become endogenously credible on
reputation grounds is included in the Appendix. Section 8 concludes.
2 Discussion and Some Examples
The root assumption of the paper is that, besides paying bribes, pressure groups have ac-
cess to a punishment technology. There is overwhelming anecdotal evidence of the use of at
least three types of punishment: threats of physical violence, legal harassment and smear
campaigns in the media. In this section we provide examples of this type of pressure group
activity, particularly when there is a potential eﬀect on the pool of policymakers. The rea-
son why threats occur in this model, as well as in Dal Bó and Di Tella (1999), is to induce
the policymaker to change his action from that preferred by society to that preferred by
the group. This includes situations where the oﬃcial yields to threats because he fears a
political damage, and not a personal one. The oﬃcial may choose a bad decision in fear that
the realization of punishment, discrediting him or his cause, may lead to his replacement
with candidates pursuing inadequate agendas thereafter. Groups could have at least two
more reasons to use threats. First, when the oﬃcial denies the group a favor, the announced
punishment might eﬀectively eliminate him, perhaps allowing a new “better disposed” of-
ﬁc i a lt ot a k eh i sp l a c e . T h i si se x p l i c i ti nt h ec a s eo fd i r e c tv i o l e n c e — s e et h ec a s eo ft h e
Colombian guerrilla discussed below. In the case of a smear campaign, or legal harassment,
the policymaker may resign or be sacked as a result of the actions of the group. Second,
one could imagine that the actions of the group make the policymaker less eﬀective. One
could assume policymakers have a stock of political capital that could be aﬀected by smear
campaigns that could force the oﬃcial to spend his time explaining himself. The results
of our model are valid when groups have these other reasons to use threats, as long as the
oﬃcial’s payoﬀ suﬀers when punishment is inﬂicted.
Physical Violence
The maﬁa has traditionally used violent means to inﬂuence politicians.12 There are also
many examples of political violence that exceed the case of maﬁa organizations. The cases
of Galina Starovoitova, gunned down on the stairs of her apartment building in November
1998, and politician Mikhail Manevich hit ﬁve times at long range as his car sped down a
12On the Sicilian maﬁa, see Gambetta (1993), who provides an analysis of the phenomenon as a private
protection industry.
6busy street in August 1997, both in St. Petersburg, are well-known examples of contract
violence against politicians.13 Some violent organizations are explicit about the expected
outcome of the threats. In early June 2002, for example, the main narco-guerrilla group in
Colombia, the FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia), launched a campaign
to intimidate politicians who oppose them or are unsympathetic to the cause. The campaign,
which includes threats of kidnapping and assassination, explicitly requested the resignation
of 463 out of 1,098 city mayors in a region of the country. Two months later two city mayors
had been killed and, with the killing of Briceno Luis Sanchez on July 14, the number of
elected city council members assassinated by the FARC reached 5. By then a total of 222
out of the 463 city mayors had resigned. Former guerrilla ﬁghter turned political analyst,
León Valencia, reﬂected “It is a tremendously cheap and eﬃcient tactic.”14
Legal Harassment
In many cases public oﬃcials have been subject to lengthy judicial processes. Often
these have been described as an instance of pressure group activities. In Latin America
the practice is so frequent that it has been given a name: the “judicialization of politics”.15
Perhaps the most extreme case is that of the former Malaysian deputy Prime Minister Anwar
Ibrahim, who was arrested on September 20, 1998 and initially held without charge under the
Internal Security Act. Amnesty International describes the events as follows: “Subsequently,
politically motivated charges of abuse of power (allegedly using his oﬃce to interfere with
police investigations into alleged sexual oﬀences and sodomy) were ﬁled against him, after
a trial which Amnesty International considered to be unfair.” In other excerpts it writes
“Anwar was sentenced in April 1999 to six years in prison. His appeals were rejected. In
September 1999 Sukma Darmawan and academic Dr. Munawar Anees were arrested and,
after pleading guilty of “having been sodomised” by Anwar Ibrahim, were sentenced to six
months in prison. They later retracted their confessions stating they were severely ill-treated
to coerce them.” It also states that “In order to remove Anwar Ibrahim from political life
and to discredit him publicly, those in power in Malaysia resorted to measures including
13See, for example, The Times, Monday, March 22, 1999. In Starovoitova’s obituary, The Economist
points out that “A problem for her enemies was that she could not be bought. She lived simply and seems
to have had no business interests.” November 28th 1998. On the Russian maﬁa, see Varese (1994). Dal Bó
and Di Tella (1999) report other assassinations in Eastern Europe, Africa, Asia and Latin America, where
it has been alleged that pressure groups were involved.
14In “Un plan diabólicamente eﬁcaz,” La Nación (Buenos Aires, Argentina), July 15, 2002 (our translation).
15See La Nación, November 8, 1998. A similar process is described in the editorial “Leave the Judiciary
out of it”, The Taipei Times, March 3, 2000. This is an extreme version of a problem analysed by political
scientists involving the process by which courts and judges come to make public policies that had previously
been made by other governmental agencies, especially legislatures and executives (see, for example, Tate and
Vallinder, 1995).
7the misuse of law, state institutions and the courts, the ill-treatment of detainees to coerce
confessions, and the erosion of the right to a fair trial.”16
A second example of politically motivated judicial harassment involves the sacking of
Pedro Pou, president of Argentina’s Central Bank in 2001 by President Fernando De la Rua,
for “bad conduct”. Pou was replaced by Roque Maccarone, an experienced banker who
“has worked for Mr Cavallo in the Economy Ministry before in the early 1990s.” In spite
of that connection, Mr Maccarone told reporters the central bank “will not be a dependency
of the Economy Ministry.” The decision “ f o l l o w e dap u b l i cf e u db e t w e e nP o ua n de c o n o m y
minister Domingo Cavallo over how to lift Argentina’s economy out of nearly three years of
deep recession. The economy minister had publicly branded the central banker a “liar” and
opposed his monetary policies.” It was also reported that “Mr Pou is charged with misman-
agement of the central bank during a high-proﬁle, $4.5bn money laundering scheme under
the presidency of Carlos Menem from 1989 to 1999. But Mr Pou’s feud with Mr Cavallo
was described by many analysts as his downfall as the economy minister attempted to wrest
control of central bank policies. Mr Cavallo has denied those allegations and the government
has said Maccarone’s appointment would not compromise the central bank’s independence on
monetary policy. Mr Pou also angered Mr Cavallo by rejecting his plans to peg the Argentine
peso to both the euro and the US dollar. Currently, the currency is pegged to the dollar
only.”17
Biased Media Coverage
A third type of action that reduces the utility of the policymaker is if pressure groups
can attack him in the press. In a number of occasions the potential for such actions has
led politicians to be less willing to enter political races. An example of this in the UK is
the problems faced by Michael Portillo, a candidate to lead the Conservative Party who
admitted to a homosexual past and who in 2001 was undecided to run because he feared
that right-wing critics would mount an anti-gay smear campaign.18 Such problems are even
more severe when pressure groups heavily sponsor or directly own media outlets because of
the possibility of biased coverage. This depends on the particular organization of the media
industry in each country. Again an extreme example is Russia in the late 1990’s, where seven
of the top eight largest ﬁnancial-industrial groups had signiﬁcant media interests. It also
suggests that the main reason for the appointment of Chernomyrdin’s successor as prime
minister (Kiriyenko) in March 1998, was his ties to the country’s business community. “His
industry pedigree may have recommended him to the leaders of Russian big business, [...].
The approval of these tycoons is well worth having. They own most of the national mass
16See <http://www.amnesty.it/news/2000/32800900.htm>.
17See BBC News, Thursday, 26 April, 2001, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/1298298.stm>.
18See “Portillo Fears Smear Campaign”, page 1, The Independent, Sunday June 10, 2001.
8media and much of the banking industry too. They can twist the arm or stain the reputation
of any minister they choose”.19
Another example of the use of the media by pressure groups involves the privatization
of Banco de Mendoza, bought by Raul Moneta, a businessman who was president of CEI—a
big media conglomerate with interests in cable, open TV, radio and the written press. After
allegations of corruption were made, a parliamentary investigation led by Gustavo Gutierrez
was launched. Following this, a series of threats and slander were levied against Gutierrez
and a fellow congressman. A report by an American agency by the name Kroll, hired by
Moneta, accused Gutierrez of a number of crimes, including arms traﬃcking and money
laundering for hundreds of millions of dollars. The accused requested that they be tried
for these alleged crimes. Fourteen judges and co-judges subsequently excused themselves.
When ﬁnally an ad-hoc judge accepted to carry out the investigation, all the charges levied
against Gutierrez were dismissed. An editorial in the leading national newspaper emphasized
the importance of this trial, given the circumstances mentioned above. It also emphasized
that the ruling “warns society and the government authorities that certain individuals are
capable of carrying out press actions and propaganda that discredits the same public oﬃcials
that are investigating them. The purpose is to frighten those in a position to investigate
them through the diﬀusion of information that destroys their public and private reputation.
This is particularly relevant these days in which so many pre-candidates prefer not to give
electoral battle given obscure situations that do not end up duly clariﬁed.”20 In another part
the editorial points out that “society as a whole should question the inﬂuence of money on
p o l i t i c s ,b o t hw h e ni ti su s e dt od e s t r o ya n dw h e ni ti su s e dt ou p h o l dac a n d i d a t e . T h i s
regrettable phenomenon is more damaging given the aggression to which citizens that get
involved in the public interest are subjected to, many of which are honorable people that the
country badly needs for its recovery. The ruling is also a warning of the possible inﬂuence of
unscrupulous “journalists”, who rather than inform the truth, accommodate their preaching
according to which is convenient to certain interests.”21
3 The Model
The model has two stages. In the ﬁrst stage, citizens with diﬀerent abilities decide whether
to apply for public oﬃce or to enter the private sector. In the second stage, the pressure
19See The Economist, April 4, 1998.
20The editorial is alluding to the mysterious decision of the most popular politician in Argentina at the
time, Carlos Reutemann, not to run in the presidential elections. The only explanation given was that he
“had seen things that he had not liked”.
21See “Preservar la Política”, Editorial I, La Nación, July 29, 2002. Our translation.
9group has the opportunity to bribe and threaten the oﬃcial to obtain a given resource.
First Stage: entry calculus by prospective oﬃcials
We assume that the economy is populated by agents indexed with an ability parameter
a ∈ [0,∞). Ability is distributed according to the function F(a), with associated density
f(a). In the ﬁrst stage of the game, individuals decide whether to apply for public oﬃce
or to enter the private sector. The wage they can earn in the private sector equals their
ability. Their earnings in the public sector depend both on the wage of the public sector
and the behavior of the pressure group. Those whose private earnings a are lower or equal
than what they expect to get in public oﬃce, apply. Therefore, if individuals expect public
oﬃce to yield a payoﬀ of P,a l lt y p e sa ≤ P will apply.22 The recruitment oﬃce chooses
an individual from the pool of applicants to occupy the available position. We assume that
the recruitment oﬃce can observe the ability of applicants and chooses the agent with the
highest ability among the applicants.23 Then, if individuals expect public oﬃce to yield a
payoﬀ of P, the public sector position will be ﬁlled with a P type. Hence, the quality of
public oﬃcials is directly determined by the payoﬀ individuals expect to get by working in
the public sector.
We assume the oﬃcial earns a ﬁxw a g ew.24 In the absence of a pressure group, the
payoﬀ P of a public oﬃcial is simply the wage. Thus, in the absence of a pressure group,
every individual with ability type less than or equal to the public wage would apply to public
oﬃce, and w would be the prevailing skill level. If a pressure group is present, the oﬃcial’s
22We assume that the payoﬀ on the private sector does not depend on the quality of the oﬃcial for
simplicity only. In a more general model we would have that the wage in the private sector is w(a,a∗), where
a is the ability of the citizen and a∗ is the ability of the politician; w(a,a∗) is increasing in both arguments
and for any P there is an a∗ that makes w(a∗,a ∗)=P. In that case we have that given the public payoﬀ
P, the equilibrium quality will be w(a∗,a ∗)=P. The lower P, the lower the equilibrium quality a∗, yielding
the same results as our simpler model.
23We want to stress the point that we might get bad politicians even when recruitment screening is
faultless. All the results in the paper are still true under a selection process in which the expected ability
of the selected politician depends positively on the highest ability among applicants. Wittman (1989) has
emphasized that a number of models on endogenous policy formation derive explanations for the existence of
ineﬃciencies from imperfect voting markets. He argues that democracies produce eﬃcient results when the
approach to modelling the market for votes is similar to that for the market for goods. Our model assumes
that democracy works well in the sense that the best candidate is always selected.
24This might be because there are cultural, legal, or other constraints to how high or low it can be. Or it
could be because oﬃcials set their own wages as high as they can. The important assumption is that wages
are ﬁxed. A rational planner may want to manipulate it to attract better candidates to public oﬃce. But
the eﬀects we analyze hold for—and are relative to—any wage level that society might choose. See Besley and
McLaren (1993) for a model where the possibility of raising wages to attract better candidates is available,
and where this does not imply the planner will necessarily want to use it.
10payoﬀ also depends on the produce of his dealings with the group.
Note that we assume that only in the public sector there is room for the use of bribes
and threats. This is done for simplicity to represent a world in which there is more outside
inﬂuence in the public sector than in the private sector. This can be justiﬁed by the fact
that inﬂuencing the decisions of a private manager may be more diﬃcult than inﬂuencing
the decisions of a public oﬃcial given the usual greater number of principals and their lower
incentives to monitor the agent in the public sector.
Second Stage: interaction between the pressure group and the public oﬃcial
In the second stage, the appointed oﬃcial performs his duties while interacting with the
pressure group. For concreteness, we can think of the oﬃcial’s output as a public good, and
the level of this public good depends positively on the oﬃcial’s ability level. Because the
overall income of society can be expected to depend on the amount of public good provided, it
follows that society will care about the ability level of the oﬃcial appointed in equilibrium.25
The oﬃcial is also assumed to have discretion on the allocation of an amount π of resources
that he can redirect towards the pressure group. This action is modeled as a lump sum,
implying that there are no eﬃciency losses in this transfer. The fact that the oﬃcial might
yield to the group’s request is just distributively bad for the vast majority of society.26
The pressure group has two instruments to inﬂuence the decisions of the oﬃcial: bribes,
b, and a threat of punishment of variable size r, which we assume to be credible.27 The
environment is symmetric. Delivering a bribe b costs βΦ(b) while delivering a punishment
r costs ρΨ(r). The parameters β>0 and ρ>0 aﬀect the costs of delivering bribes and
threats respectively. We assume that Φ(·) and Ψ(·) are both twice continuously diﬀerentiable,
Φ(0) = Ψ(0) = 0, Φ0(0) = Ψ0(0) = 0, Φ0 > 0,Φ00 > 0,Ψ0 > 0, and Ψ00 > 0.W h e nt h eo ﬃcial
receives the bribe oﬀer and the threat of punishment, he believes that both will be delivered
in case he respectively accepts or rejects the group’s proposal. We impose very simple
preferences on the oﬃcial: he cares linearly about money, punishment, and the cost h of
25The point is that the beneﬁt must exceed the wage. In Rosen (1982) assigning persons of superior talent
to top positions increases productivity by more than the increments of their abilities because greater talent
ﬁlters through the entire organization.
26We can abstract from the fact that inﬂuence might be undesirable because of distributive or direct
eﬃciency reasons—like when the transfer is done through a tariﬀ or another distortive instrument.
27For concreteness, threats can be viewed as physical violence against the politician. As explained in
Section 2, an important class of threats include false accusations of bribe-taking by the public oﬃcial. In
the simple set up of this section, such punishment would ”reveal” that the oﬃcial is honest. Extending
the model to include other potential sources of accusations (for example from an honest, but imprecise,
anticorruption watchdog) is simple and is done in section 6. With respect to the credibility assumption,
Appendix 2 considers the case in which threats become endogenously credible on reputation grounds. A
previous version of the paper shows that the results go through in a more complicated, ﬁnite horizon set up.
11getting involved in a corrupt deal. The latter can be seen as a moral or any other type of
cost incurred when accepting a bribe, including risks of detection and the cost of ensuring
secrecy.
We assume that with probability 1−γ it is impossible for the oﬃcial to accept the corrupt
proposal and his only choice is to reject the oﬀer and face the threats.28 In this case, the
oﬃcial’s payoﬀ is w − r. With probability γ the oﬃcial can decide between accepting or
rejecting the corrupt deal. The oﬃcial will accept the bribe (and do a favor to the group)
as long as his payoﬀ from so doing is greater or equal than the payoﬀ from refusing,
w + b − h ≥ w − r, (1)
This condition implies that every oﬃcial will accept if b ≥ h − r.
The pressure group sets bribes b and punishment r to maximize its expected proﬁts Π
given by,
Π(b,r)=γ{π − βΦ(b)} − (1 − γ)ρΨ(r) (2)
s.t. b ≥ h − r.
Denote with b∗ and r∗ the quantities maximizing Π(b,r) for an active pressure group. If
Π(b∗,r∗) is nonnegative, we say the group does indeed want to engage in inﬂuence activities.
If it is negative, we say the group prefers to stay inactive earning no proﬁts. When char-
acterizing equilibrium, we will look at the threshold level ¯ π(γ,β,ρ) that allows the group
to make money by becoming active—this is, the level of π satisfying Π(b∗,r∗)=0 , given the
parameter values γ,β, and ρ. An important element in this paper will be what we denote
degree of state capture,
Deﬁnition 1 The magnitude ¯ π is an inverse measure of the degree of state capture.
One important feature of a society is how often corruption takes place. When we talk
about “pervasive” corruption, we sometimes have in mind a society where corruption happens
in a high fraction of interactions between oﬃcials and private interests. ¯ π denotes the size of
28This might obey to a circumstantial impossibility to strike a deal, say because random auditing is taking
place. Another interpretation is that 1−γ is a fraction of inﬁnitely honest individuals in the population, who
are incorruptible. Self-selection eﬀects do not arise in equilibrium as long as the group has all bargaining
power, because the two types get identical payoﬀs. If oﬃcials have bargaining power we should either
stick with the ﬁrst interpretation or assume that oﬃcials only learn fully how much they dislike engaging
in corruption after making their entry decisions (as done, for instance, by Acemoglu and Verdier, 2000).
Such an assumption seems realistic because individuals do not have experience with such activities prior to
entering public life, although it certainly allows individuals to have rational estimates of their moral costs in
average.
12the set of possible values of π for which the group cannot engage in inﬂuence activities. One
way of interpreting the measure ¯ π is as the chance that a group will not be able to aﬀord to
corrupt the oﬃcial.29
4 Results With Bribes Only
4.1 The equilibrium
As a benchmark, we start our analysis by setting r =0exogenously. In other words,
we have a standard corruption model where only bribes can be used as an instrument of
political inﬂuence. If active, the pressure group will decide on an optimal bribe level b◦,b y
maximizing,
Π(b,0) = γ{π − βΦ(b)}.
We know from expression (1) that there is no point in paying a bribe any higher than h since
all the bargaining power is on the group’s side. Hence the group will set b◦ = h whenever
the gain π covers the cost βΦ(h) of such a bribe. A group for whom π is smaller than the
threshold value ¯ π0 ≡ βΦ(b◦)=βΦ(h) can only remain inactive. It follows that,
Lemma 1 a) An active group will set b◦ = h.
b) The group only becomes active if π is larger than ¯ π0 ≡ βΦ(b◦)=βΦ(h).
The bribe level and the fact that the group may or may not aﬀord to be active fully
determine the payoﬀ for prospective applicants to public oﬃce. If π ≥ ¯ π, the group is active
and the payoﬀ for the oﬃcial is w + b◦ − h = w.I fπ<¯ π, the group stays inactive and the
payoﬀ for the oﬃcial is again w. This implies that, in a world without threats, individuals
whose ability type a satisﬁes,
a ≤ w,
will apply, and the recruiter will appoint an oﬃcial of type w. It follows that,
Lemma 2 In a world with only bribes, the quality of the oﬃcial is w regardless of whether
the group is active or not.
29We could also extend the model so that π is drawn from a distribution Z(.) with support in [0,∞).W e
would then have a measure Z(¯ π) representing the probability that the group (or the fraction of groups who)
will not be able to oﬀer “plata o plomo”. Of course, capture will be successful only a fraction γ of these
cases. In any case, ¯ π can be seen as an inverse measure of the pervasiveness of capture given γ and Z(.).
134.2 Room for inﬂuence and the quality of oﬃc i a l si naw o r l dw i t h
only bribes
A lower value of the parameter β captures improvements in the bribing technology. This
could reﬂect a more lax environment regarding the payment of bribes, as when ﬁrm’s and
individual’s ﬁnancial movements are not well monitored and balance sheets and individual
income tax forms are not heavily scrutinized—perhaps because auditing ﬁrms are not reliable
or income taxes are not in fully in place. A reduction in the cost of paying bribes allows
pressure groups with lower proﬁts to enter the business of bribing oﬃcials, increasing the
degree of state capture. However, variations in the cost of bribes do not aﬀect the quality of
politicians given that their payoﬀ is independent of the group being active or not.
Proposition 1 More room for inﬂuence through bribes (a lower β)i m p l i e sah i g h e rd e g r e e
of state capture but it does not decrease the quality of politicians.
Proof. See Appendix.
When, as in our model, all bargaining power is on the group’s side, movements in β have
no bearing on the quality of politicians. Note, however, that when the oﬃcial has some
bargaining power and b◦ >h ,h i sp a y o ﬀ improves when paying bribes becomes easier for the
group (as the surplus π −βΦ(b) grows). Hence, in the benchmark case with only bribes and
no threats, there is a tendency for higher capture through bribes to, if anything, actually
improve the quality of politicians.
5 Results With Bribes and Threats
5.1 The equilibrium
In this section we allow the group to choose both bribes and threats freely. We characterize
ﬁrst the behavior of the pressure group and we study its eﬀect on the entry decision of the
oﬃcial. Then we compare the degree of state capture and the quality of politicians with the
values obtained in a world with only bribes.
We start by studying the optimal bribes and threats ”oﬀered” by an active pressure group.
From expression (1) we know that, given some r, the most convenient bribe is b = h − r.
Paying more will not convince an incorruptible oﬃcial, and paying just that is enough to
make the other type accept doing favors to the group. In addition, given that the marginal
cost of starting to use any of the two instruments is zero, an active pressure group uses both
bribes and threats in positive amounts.
14We study now the conditions under which a pressure group will decide to be active.
The pressure group would like to be active if the optimal bribes and threats (b∗,r ∗) result
in positive proﬁts. Then, the pressure group makes the “plata o plomo”o ﬀer (b∗,r ∗) if
Π(b∗,r∗) ≥ 0, and chooses to stay inactive otherwise. Given that the proﬁts of the active
pressure group are increasing in π and there is a positive cost to inﬂuence the oﬃcial, there
exist a critical value ¯ π under which the pressure group would rather not exert pressure. This
critical value is ¯ π ≡
(1−γ)
γ ρΨ(r∗)+βΦ(h − r∗). Summarizing,
Lemma 3 a) An active group sets bribes b∗ and threats r∗ such that b∗ = h−r∗, b∗ > 0 and
r∗ > 0.





If π is above the critical level ¯ π the pressure group uses both bribes and threats to
inﬂuence the oﬃcial. The threat allows the pressure group to inﬂuence the oﬃcial without
paying the full cost of changing the decision but by paying only h−r∗ (Lemma 3-a) while it
needs to pay h in a world without threats. Then, if politicians are being coerced by groups
they will tend to sell their favors cheaply. Tullock (1972) has pointed out that lobbying
activities seem to involve too little money relative to the amount of resources that special
interests can obtain from the political process.30
Proposition 2 (comparison of Lemmas 1-a and 3-a) Bribe oﬀers are lower in a world with
bribes and threats.
In this way, in a world with bribes and threats an active pressure group will result in a
payoﬀ for the oﬃcial of w − r∗ while an inactive group results in a payoﬀ of w.G i v e nt h a t
citizens with ability higher than the payoﬀ from public oﬃce do not even apply, we have the
following:
Lemma 4 In a world with bribes and threats, the quality of oﬃcials is w − r∗ if the group
is active and w if it is not.
While in a world without threats the quality of politicians is w,i naw o r l dw i t ht h r e a t s
and an active group the quality is only w−r∗. Since an active pressure group avoids paying
the full bribe by using threats, the payoﬀ and quality of politicians is lower in a world with
threats than it is in a world without threats. It then follows that,
30See also Ramseyer and Rasmusen (1992), Helpman and Persson (1998), Leaver and Makris (1999),
Ansolabehere, de Figueiredo and Snyder (2002), Rotemberg (2002), inter alia.
15Proposition 3 (comparison of Lemmas 2 and 4) The quality of the oﬃcial is lower in a
world with threats.
A fundamental feature of our model is that the possibility of using threats lowers the
entry barrier to the inﬂuence activity. Given that an active pressure group would use threats
to inﬂuence the oﬃcial, its proﬁts are necessarily higher in a world with threats. Therefore,
the set of values of π for which the group is active is larger in a world with threats than in
a world without. This is characterized in the following proposition,
Proposition 4 (comparison of Lemmas 1-b and 3-b) The degree of state capture is higher
when threats are available (ie., ¯ π<¯ π0).
Proof: See Appendix.
If ¯ π is interpreted as the inverse of a measure of the number of active groups dealing
with oﬃcials across society, the message of our last proposition is that a world with threats
features more frequent corruption. We turn now to studying the eﬀects of parameter changes
aﬀecting the scope for political inﬂuence.
5.2 Room for inﬂuence and the quality of oﬃc i a l si naw o r l dw i t h
bribes and threats
We establish our main results in this section. We study the eﬀect of changes on the cost of
bribes and threats on the behavior of the pressure group, the degree of state capture and
the quality of politicians.
A decrease in the cost of bribes would make bribes more attractive for an active group,
resulting in a substitution of bribes for threats. In the same way a decrease in the cost of
threats would result in a substitution of threats for bribes by an active group.
Lemma 5 a) More room for inﬂuence through bribes (a lower β)i m p l i e sal o w e rr∗,w h i l e
b) more room for inﬂuence through threats (a lower ρ)i m p l i e sah i g h e rr∗.
Proof. See Appendix.
A direct implication of this lemma is that when inﬂuence through bribes becomes easier,
equilibrium bribes b∗ = h − r∗ by active groups will be higher. On the other hand, when
it is inﬂuence through threats which becomes easier, equilibrium bribes b∗ = h − r∗ become
smaller.
It is important to characterize how changes in β and ρ aﬀect our measure of state capture.
Any decrease in the cost of inﬂuence will necessarily increase the proﬁts of an active pressure
16g r o u pr e s u l t i n gi na ni n c r e a s ei nt h es e to fv a l u e so fπ that allow the pressure group to be
active. That is, the threshold level ¯ π is positively related to the cost parameters. When
inﬂuence—either through bribes or threats—becomes less costly, the threshold goes down,
implying that groups with lower stakes will be able to aﬀord inﬂuencing oﬃcials through the
“plata o plomo” mechanism. This amounts to saying that societies where groups have easier
access to bribing and punishment technologies can expect to have more pervasive corruption.
Proposition 5 More room for inﬂuence through either bribes (a lower β)o rt h r e a t s( al o w e r
ρ) increases the degree of state capture.
Proof. See Appendix.
We can now establish results relating changes in the costs of bribes and threats on the
quality of politicians.
Proposition 6 a) More room for inﬂuence through bribes (a lower β) has an ambiguous
eﬀect on the payoﬀ of oﬃcials and their quality.
b) More room for inﬂuence through threats (a lower ρ) decreases the payoﬀ of oﬃcials,
lowering their quality.
Proof: See Appendix.
We discuss ﬁrst part a). The intuition for a decrease in β having an ambiguous eﬀect
on the quality of politicians is as follows. On the one hand, the payoﬀ of an oﬃcial facing
a group that is active both before and after such change will increase, because a lower β
implies lower threats and higher bribes (Lemma 5-a). This would go in the “traditional”
direction, according to which more inﬂuence through bribes can improve the oﬃcial’s payoﬀ,
and hence the quality of politicians. However, a lower β implies that a group with a low π
t h a tw a si n a c t i v em i g h tn o wb ea b l et ob e c o m ea c t i v e( P r o p o s i t i o n5 ) ,b u tn o to n l yp a y i n g
bribes! Therefore, in a world where threats are allowed, the fact that paying bribes gets
easier implies a lower barrier to entry to the p l a t aop l o m oinﬂuence business. And this
business lowers the payoﬀ of oﬃcials. Then, we have that a lower β c a nr e s u l ti ne i t h e ra
higher or lower payoﬀ and quality of the oﬃcial.
This result shows that the inclusion of threats can alter the predictions concerning changes
in the cost of bribes—the instrument of inﬂuence on which the literature focuses attention.
While cheaper bribes can never harm the quality of politicians in a world with only bribes
(Proposition 1), in a world with bribes and threats they certainly can. Higher levels of
17capture following from groups ﬁnding it easier to pay bribes may be associated with worse
politicians, and not merely with more frequent wrongdoing.31
Turn now to part b). A lower ρ would reﬂect a world where it is cheaper to hire thugs,
inﬂuence the media, or manipulate the judicial system. A lower cost of threats can have
two eﬀects. First, if the group was active before, a lower ρ will result in a more intensive
use of threats (Lemma 5-b), lowering the payoﬀ of the oﬃcial and its equilibrium quality.
Second, if the group was not active before, a lower ρ m a yr e s u l ti nt h eg r o u pb e c o m i n g
active (Proposition 5). Given that active pressure groups use threats, this can only result in
al o w e rp a y o ﬀ for the oﬃcial with a similar eﬀect on its equilibrium quality. Together with
Proposition 5 (more room for inﬂuence increases state capture), Proposition 6-b suggests
that societies where groups have easier access to punishment technologies will tend to have
more frequent corruption and worse politicians.
One might think that if society is governed by politicians of low ability because threats
are high, someone will want to raise public wages in order to attract better candidates. This
might indeed be the case. But for any level of wages chosen by the public, the quality
of politicians will be worse when threats exist and groups ﬁnd it easier to exert inﬂuence,
relative to when threats are more expensive to use or are simply not available. Furthermore,
the public may need to pay very large wages if the threats involve physical violence, so it
m a yb em o r ec o s t - e ﬀective to direct resources to limiting the scope for political inﬂuence.
6 Explaining Immunity
Our model can be applied to the analysis of the institution of oﬃcial immunity. A number of
countries have some form of legal protection for policymakers. These range from immunity
from libel for things said during parliamentary debates, to stronger forms of immunity—
including protection from criminal prosecution while in oﬃce. Moreover, over the recent past
there have been numerous attempts to change this institution in important ways.32 Immunity
has been debated around the ﬁgure of elected politicians (as in the Chirac example in the
introduction), but also in relation with appointed oﬃcials such as central bankers. We ﬁrst
illustrate the importance of the institution of oﬃcial immunity by exposing in detail the case
of the Central Bank in Argentina (BCRA), which gained international notoriety during 2002
31This is still true if we give oﬃcials some bargaining power, although if might not be if this power is too
high.
32In Russia, Putin has requested the power to strip governors of their legal immunity from prosecution.
See, “Putin’s Power Play”, Business Week, June 5, 2000. In Nicaragua, oﬃcial immunity has recently come
under harsh criticism. For a defense, see “La Inmunidad del Funcionario Público”, La Prensa, March 14,
2002.
18in relation to that country’s ﬁnancial crisis. We then investigate formally the possibility that
protecting oﬃcials from accusations of corruption may actually curb corruption and improve
the equilibrium quality of oﬃcials.
Immunity for Central Bankers: The Case of Argentina
The granting of immunity to the president and board of directors of the Central Bank of
Argentina (BCRA) was the subject of a heated political debate during 2002, in the context
of the country’s negotiations with the IMF. Argentina’s banking sector suﬀered from ineﬀec-
tive regulation and supervision and repeated, forced government rescues (see, for example,
Calomiris and Powell, 2000). Given the very weak judicial institutions, it seems that banks
that are aﬀected by the decisions of the Central Bank ﬁnd it easy to initiate legal actions
against bank regulators. The problem is so acute that a former president of the BCRA at
one point faced 32 legal demands against him. The problem has been described in the recent
banking literature, by Gale and Vives (2002): “A related problem (in Argentina, for example)
is the lack of legal protection that a supervisor has when attempting to discipline a bank in
trouble. Then even if the perceived problem is serious the bank may be allowed to continue
or even granted help.”
An initial reaction to this phenomenon was the approval of an internal BCRA norm
stipulating that employees that are the subject of a penal process originating in events
derived from their oﬃcial duties will receive in advance a sum of funds that will cover their
legal defense expenses.33 After the separation of Pedro Pou from the presidency in 2001 (see
also Section 2 above), and with the onset of the banking crisis, the subject of legal immunity
for the president and members of the board of directors of the BCRA became a central
i s s u ei nA r g e n t i n a . I nt h eﬁrst half of 2002, the topic was in the front page of virtually
every newspaper in the country, and the focus of the negotiation between the IMF, the
government and the main opposition parties. Banks had been closed since early December
2001, and by July 2002 had not reopened in spite of a dramatic contraction in GDP. A
key ingredient for the bank restructuring involved the closing of insolvent banks. Given past
experience, the new president of the BCRA, Mario Blejer, publicly asked that legal immunity
be granted. With two unfulﬁlled vacancies in the directorate, the authorities were reluctant
to undertake a major bank restructuring without some form of legal protection.34 The
33Estatuto del Personal, article 13. Interestingly, a document prepared by the BCRA evaluating the
Bank’s performance, argues that a basic principle of eﬀective central bank supervision is the presence of an
adequate legal framework protecting bank supervisors. The document judges the performance of the Bank
in this respect unsatisfactory. In Basic Principles for an Eﬀective Bank Supervision: Self-Evaluation (in
Spanish), November 2000.
34A former president of the BCRA stated (personal communication) that the job had been oﬀered to
“fourteen distinguished professionals”, but that all had declined.
19rejection of the initiative to grant immunity by Congress was followed by Blejer’s resignation
and the appointment of Aldo Pignanelli, of Peronist extraction, as new President of the
BCRA in a move widely considered as marking the end of a period of relative central bank
independence.
Interestingly, it has been argued that the kind of protection oﬀered by immunity “is
consistent with the ﬁrst of the Basle Core Principles for Eﬀective Bank Supervision” although
“As adequate legal protection for supervisory oﬃcials is achieved, it is worth putting in
place counterbalancing elements. For instance, an independent advisory body — made up
of knowledgeable and reputable people— could be set up to survey the activities of oﬃcial
supervisors and assess fairness in the application of norms.” (De la Torre, 2000). In the
formal analysis that follows we take into account the tension between the possible beneﬁts
of immunity, and its negative side: reducing the accountability of oﬃcials.
Immunity and the degree of state capture
We now investigate formally the paradoxical statement that by insulating oﬃcials from
accusations of corruption, society might make corruption less frequent. The existence of
accusations that have a tainted origin—they are actually waved to force oﬃcials into corrupt
deals—has the potential to generate such a paradox. The eﬀect of immunity is twofold. On
the one hand, it beneﬁts honest oﬃcials by insulating them from judicial actions that might
have been manipulated by a pressure group, while on the other hand, it makes corrupt
oﬃcials less accountable to an independent judiciary. Clearly the impact of the threats will
depend on the quality of the judiciary. An honest and eﬀective judiciary system increases
the cost of corrupt deals while protecting the politicians from false accusations.
To investigate these eﬀects further, we now modify the model presented in section 3 to
include the eﬀect of immunity and the quality of the judiciary. Assume that accepting the
group’s oﬀer implies taking a gamble. A fraction θ ∈ [0,1] of oﬃcials accepting bribes are
detected. This parameter θ summarizes the eﬃcacy of the judiciary. When caught, bribed
oﬃcials lose their wage, the bribe received, and they pay a moral cost m for having been
corrupted. When not caught, corrupt oﬃc i a l sk e e pb o t hw a g e sa n db r i b e s ,a n do n l yp a yt h e
moral cost m associated to wrongdoing. Immunity is parameterized with i ∈ [0,1].Ad e g r e e
of immunity i does two things. First, it reduces the probability of detection (presumably, by
independent judges) of wrongdoers to θ(1 − i); complete immunity, then (ie. i =1 ), makes
corrupt oﬃcials undetectable, while no immunity (i =0 ) makes them fully detectable (at
the usual rate of discovery by the judicial system, θ). The other eﬀect of immunity is to
m i t i g a t et h ei m p a c to ff a l s ea c c u s a t i o n st h a ta r en o td i s c a r d e db yt h ej u d i c i a r y ,s ot h a ta
threat of punishment r becomes (1 − i)(1 − θ)r.A s a r e s u l t , a n o ﬃcial accepting bribes
makes (w +b)[1−θ(1−i)]−m, while one rejecting them receives w −(1−i)(1−θ)r.N o t e
20that the last expression uses the fact that the threats, r, are legal in nature and that a good
judiciary would render them invalid. In other words, a good judiciary can also discard bogus
accusations.
Therefore, changes in immunity aﬀect both the utility that a politician derives from
accepting the corrupt deal as the utility from rejecting it. When justice is relatively ineﬀective
(θ is low), immunity has a greater eﬀect on protecting the honest politician from false
accusations than on sheltering the corrupt politician from justice. Then, when justice is
relatively ineﬀective, increases in immunity will result in the interest group having to incur
higher pressure costs in order to aﬀect the behavior of the politician. In this case higher
immunity makes corruption more expensive to groups, and thus fewer groups should be able
to aﬀord it. On the contrary, when justice is relatively eﬀective, an increase in immunity
has a higher eﬀect on sheltering the corrupt politician than in protecting the honest one,
reducing the costs of pressure and increasing state capture.
Proposition 7 If justice is relatively ineﬀe c t i v eh i g h e ri m m u n i t yr e d u c e ss t a t ec a p t u r e ,w h i l e
if justice is relatively eﬀective higher immunity increases state capture.
Proof: See Appendix.
The importance of this proposition is that it shows that the paradoxical beneﬁcial eﬀect
of immunity exists, but only if justice is ineﬀective enough. Therefore, debates regarding
whether certain oﬃcials should receive immunity in order to act more independently cannot
take place without considering the general situation of justice in the country. Countries
that have a good judiciary may not beneﬁt much from this institution. In a country like
Argentina, where the judicial system is relatively corrupt and ineﬀective, various institutions
granting legal immunity to policymakers may play a useful role.
Immunity and the quality of politicians
Immunity may aﬀect the quality of the citizens willing to enter public life. An increase in
immunity may aﬀect the use of bribes and threats by an active pressure group, thus having
an eﬀect on the payoﬀs and quality of politicians. We initially abstract from the eﬀect that
immunity might have on the decision of the group to participate in the pressure business,
and take it as given that variations in immunity will not drive the group out of the pressure
game.
The impact of immunity on the ability of politicians can be studied by looking at the
equilibrium utility of oﬃcials: w − (1 − i)(1 − θ)r∗(i).D i ﬀerentiating this expression with
respect to i we get, (1 − θ)r∗(i) − (1 − i)(1 − θ)dr∗
di .T h eﬁrst term in this expression is the
increase in protection that arises from an increase in immunity, while the second term is
21the impact from changes in the amount of threats. Hence, with an active pressure group, a
suﬃcient condition for higher immunity to improve the quality of politicians is that higher
immunity decrease the size of equilibrium threats (dr∗
di ≤ 0). In fact, if justice is relatively
eﬀective, it can be shown that an increase in immunity will result in a reduction in the use
of threats by active pressure groups, thus raising the quality of politicians.
Proposition 8 With an active pressure group and a relatively eﬀective judicial system, an
increase in immunity improves the quality of politicians.
Proof: See Appendix.
Note that Proposition 8 provides a suﬃcient but not necessary condition for an increase in
immunity to improve the quality of politicians. There can certainly be cases where increases
in immunity result in an increase in politicians’ payoﬀsa n dq u a l i t ye v e nw i t ha ni n e ﬀective
justice.
Another way in which changes in immunity may aﬀect the quality of politicians is through
changes in the degree of state capture. Changes in the degree of capture may aﬀect the
pressure group’s decision to participate in the pressure business. For example, in a society
with a relatively eﬀective judicial system, an increase in immunity increases the degree of
capture and may result in an inactive pressure group deciding to become active with a
negative eﬀect on the ﬁnal quality of politicians.
In a world with several pressure groups interested in resources with diﬀerent values π,
changes in immunity may aﬀect the quality of politicians both through changes in the degree
of state capture (changes in the number of groups that participate in pressure activities) as
through changes in the amount of threats that active pressure groups use. While it is not
possible to present general results regarding the interaction of these two eﬀects with our
general assumptions, it is interesting to note that a society may face a trade oﬀ between the
degree of state capture and the quality of politicians when deciding the optimal amount of
immunity. If justice is relatively eﬃcient, an increase in immunity will result in an increase
in the degree of state capture and a decrease in the use of threats by active pressure groups,
as shown before. That is, some new groups will enter the pressure activity with a negative
eﬀect on the payoﬀ and quality of oﬃcials while the groups that were already active will
pay higher bribes and use weaker threats. There are circumstances where the second eﬀect
will dominate and an increase in immunity will result in an increase of both state capture
and the quality of politicians. We then have that in societies with good judiciary systems a
trade-oﬀ emerges: raising immunity may improve the ability of the political class, but only
at the cost of more frequent corruption.
227 Further Results and Extensions
In this section we return to the original model to study how changes in the amount of
resources that the oﬃcial can redistribute aﬀect the behavior of the pressure group and
the quality of politicians. We then extend the model to analyze the possibility of multiple
equilibria when the incompetence of politicians reinforces the conditions that make their
emergence more likely.
7.1 Discretion, corruption, and the quality of politicians
At least since the work of Tullock (1967) and Krueger (1974), economists associate the
possibility of oﬃcial discretion with rent-seeking waste and worse economic performance.
Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1991) present a model where rent seeking drives talent out of
innovative activities damaging growth. Ades and Di Tella (1999) present evidence consistent
with the hypothesis that more rents create corruption. But even if there is capture, there
will still be occasions when some intervention is justiﬁed (see Acemoglu and Verdier, 2000).
Here we perform a simple exercise: we ask how levels of state capture and the quality of
politicians would evolve if we enlarge the size of resources under oﬃcial discretion.
>From section 5, we know that in a world with threats the quality of politicians is lower
when the pressure group is active and that the pressure group will be active only if the
amount of resources it can get covers bribing and threatening costs (π ≥ ¯ π). Therefore, a
decrease in π to a value below ¯ π results in the pressure group becoming inactive and, hence,
in an increase in the quality of politicians. Therefore a decrease in the amount of resources
subject to oﬃcial discretion may reduce the amount of threats that oﬃcials face and increase
the appeal of public oﬃce for citizens of higher ability. It follows that,
Proposition 9 A decrease in the amount of resources subject to oﬃcial discretion has a
positive eﬀect on the quality of politicians.
Thus, political discretion in the allocation of resources may not only lead to waste through
rent seeking activities. It will generate, ﬁrst, a higher fraction of corrupt decisions and,
second, a negative eﬀect on the quality of politicians through the use of threats by rent
seekers.
7.2 Multiple Equilibria
We can explain cross-country variations in the quality of politicians by considering a single
equilibrium and showing that higher values of the parameter capturing the scope for pressure
through threats imply a lower quality of politicians. Caselli and Morelli (2001) read the
23empirical evidence as justifying an interest in multiple equilibria. In our model, multiplicity
arises naturally if the quality of politicians aﬀects the scope for threats being used. One
possibility is that if politicians are generally expected to be of low quality, a smear campaign
may be easier to organize. Another plausible channel is that bad politicians may provide less
public goods of which law enforcement may be one example. This may enhance the ability
of the group to threaten the oﬃcials, thus lowering their expected payoﬀs, and therefore
their equilibrium quality. On the contrary, high quality politicians will provide tight law
enforcement, thus reducing the chances for punishments being used. This should raise the
expected payoﬀ of oﬃcials and, consequently, their quality in equilibrium.
Denote with gt t h el e v e lo ft h ep u b l i cg o o da v a i l a b l ei np e r i o dt. This represents the
quality of law enforcement, or the amount of anti-libel regulation in the media industry,
prevailing in period t. Assume also that gt depends simply on the quality of oﬃcials during
period t−1:gt = at−1, denoting a world where the quality of law enforcement today depends
on the quality of the people that have been responsible for it in the immediate past. A higher
level of g will typically imply a higher value of ρ: the total and marginal costs of exerting
pressure through threats go up with tighter law enforcement or stricter anti-libel regulations.
So we will write ρ(g),w h e r eρ0 > 0. To keep things simple, suppose that g does not aﬀect
β. We showed in the previous section that the payoﬀ of politicians (call it P(b∗,r ∗))w a s
increasing in ρ: if the group stays active after an increase in ρ, the lower threats and higher
bribes imply a higher payoﬀ for the oﬃcial. If an increase in ρ brings about the group
switching to inactivity, this raises the payoﬀ of the oﬃcial discretely from w − r∗ to w.L e t
us for simplicity focus on a range of variation of ρ such that the group is always active and
increases in ρ bring about improvements in the payoﬀ of politicians in a continuous way. As
in this case the payoﬀ P(b∗,r ∗)=w −r∗(ρ) is increasing in ρ, then it is also increasing in g.
We can then write P0(g) > 0.
We do not want to make precise statements about existence nor stability of any particular
equilibrium. That is, we do not claim that multiple equilibria will deﬁnitely exist, nor that
they must look precisely like those shown below. Rather, we want to show that multiple
equilibria can arise, and that some of them could be “bad”, in the sense that appointing bad
politicians reinforces the conditions that make bad politicians the only ones to be available.
Then, for the sake of the argument, let us make a reasonable assumption: that higher levels
of the public good have diminishing marginal returns in terms of the improvements they
produce on the payoﬀ of politicians. Hence,
d2P{·}
dg2 < 0. Moreover, if the prevailing level of
g is zero, we can assume that ρ attains some lower bound, threats are very high, and hence
the payoﬀ of politicians is very low. Note nothing prevents it from being negative for some
very low ρ. In that case no citizen would apply for public oﬃce and with no politician in
oﬃce g is zero and the group presumably obtains π w i t h o u th a v i n gt od e a lw i t ha n yo ﬃcial.
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Figure 1: Multiple equilibria in the quality of politicians and public goods
The horizontal axis in this picture measures two variables. On the one hand it measures gt,
the prevailing level of the public good in the economy at period t. On the other, it measures
at, the ability of an individual considering applying for public oﬃce in period t.T h ev e r t i c a l
axis measures payoﬀs from being in the private and public sector in period t.T h e f o r m e r
are given by the ability of each individual (through the 45 degree line), while the latter are
given by P(gt). Note that, in any period t, Pt = P(gt)=P(at−1)=P[P(gt−1)] = P(Pt−1),
and equilibrium is characterized by Pt = Pt−1,o rgt = gt−1 (i.e. by the intersections of the
45 degree line and P(gt)).
To see how we can get multiple equilibria, suppose that, being concave, P(gt) cuts the
45 degree line twice: ﬁr s ta tal e v e l¯ g and then at a higher level ˆ g. Start with a public good
level g0 < ¯ g. This generates an anticipated reward from entering public service of P(g0).
Now ﬁnding the reﬂection of P(g0) in the horizontal axis we see that an individual with
type a0 = g0 would earn precisely a0 = g0 >P(g0) in the private sector. Thus, no individual
with a type higher than or equal to P(g0) would enter the public sector. So if the oﬃcials
producing the public good in t − 1 were of type a0 = g0 (they must have been if the public
good level was g0) they would quit and leave their posts to people with lower types. This
process would go on for any public good level g<¯ g. So if a society starts anywhere below
¯ g, it would converge to a bad equilibrium in which g =0 .T h i si sas i t u a t i o ni nw h i c ht h e r e
is no law enforcement and groups can reduce the utility of oﬃcials with great ease. Thus,
any individual with the ability to earn positive amounts in the private sector will stay out
of public life. In this situation, the pressure group appropriates π w i t h o u th a v i n gt od e a l
with any oﬃcial. For g =¯ g, we have an unstable equilibrium. And for g>¯ g,as i m i l a r
argument to that one just made for g<¯ g ensures society will tend to enjoy a public good
of size ˆ g. This will allow higher rewards from public life and attract people of type ˆ a =ˆ g to
25the public sector. This is a stable equilibrium with high quality politicians and little room
for the pressure group to threaten them.35
8C o n c l u s i o n
We develop a model where pressure groups use both carrots (plata)a n ds t i c k s( plomo)i n
their attempt to inﬂuence policy. Our approach has a number of advantages. First, it has
descriptive appeal since there is overwhelming evidence of the existence of pressure groups
that use bribes and threats (including smear campaigns in the media, legal harassment, and
violence) in both less developed and transition countries, as well as in some of the industrial
democracies. Second, it has some theoretical relevance because it seems ad hoc to restrict
a pressure group’s action space to include only one type of instrument. Interestingly, some
of the predictions of the model are a result of considering both instruments simultaneously
(i.e. the interaction), and could not be generated by a model that considers bribes (or
threats) alone. Third, the approach is empirically promising because a number of the model’s
predictions could not be generated by the standard approach (with only bribes or campaign
contributions), such as those concerning the quality of public oﬃcials or those on the value
of granting politicians with legal immunity.
Our model has two stages. In the ﬁrst, citizens decide to enter public life depending
on the total expected payoﬀ received by public oﬃcials. In the second stage, the oﬃcial
is inﬂuenced by a pressure group that has access to both a bribe and a threat technology.
A simple result is that both bribes and punishments are used in equilibrium, explaining
t h en o n - r h e t o r i c a ln a t u r eo ft h e“ Plata o Plomo?” question. This is unfortunate because
punishments introduce an element of ineﬃciency into our model (while bribes are mainly
transfers). The reason ineﬃcient actions are used is because they allow the group to save on
bribes. Indeed, a feature of our equilibrium is that decisions that are valuable to the groups
are provided by the policymakers in exchange for relatively small sums of money, a result
that can be linked to Tullock’s (1972) observation that there seems to be too little money in
lobbying in the US.
35Caselli and Morelli (1999), which has inspired this section, shows that there can be multiple equilibria
when the rewards from oﬃce are increasing in the average quality of oﬃce holders. The bad equilibrium
requires that a good quality candidate refrains from entering as he prefers to be surrounded by good quality
candidates rather than with bad quality ones. This assumption gives low weight to the possibility that such
an exceptional candidate would be held in high esteem by the public. The assumption that quality of law
enforcement is increasing in the quality of previous oﬃcials is perhaps more plausible. Another issue is
robustness. In their model the bad equilibrium can be avoided if a candidate stands for election oﬀering to
raise wages or if it coordinates to run for oﬃce with other high quality types. In our model generating a
high g that improves the environment for future oﬃcials is not directly rewarding for any one individual.
26A number of the empirical predictions of the model are in contradiction to those arising
in models in the traditional approach (where only bribes are used). For example, the basic
result for the benchmark case where groups only use bribes (and cannot use threats), is that
factors that make it cheaper for groups to oﬀer bribes will introduce a tendency for higher
monetary rewards to being in oﬃce. This means that increases in state capture will tend to
be associated with higher ability of public oﬃcials. This prediction, common to all models
of political inﬂuence based on bribes, cannot explain why countries with high indices of
capture exhibit a public service of appalling quality. We then show that allowing for bribes
and threats of punishments to be used in the inﬂuence process introduces a tendency for
lower rewards to public life. Thus, when countries experience higher degrees of state capture
through threats, they will also tend to have a political class of lower ability. Interestingly,
when threats are present, more scope for inﬂuence through bribes may also lead to appointed
oﬃcials of lower quality. This suggests that the use of threats changes the nature of the
inﬂuence game.
Economists have shown how cross-country diﬀerences in income can be explained by
factors such as diﬀerential access to technology or diﬀerences in savings rates. Linking state
capture—and the factors that facilitate it—with the quality of oﬃcials is of interest, given that
a relatively unexplored explanation for cross-country diﬀerences in income is the variation
in the competence of those in charge of selecting policies. We show how factors such as the
prevalence of violence or the amount of discretion enjoyed by oﬃcials can aﬀect the quality
of the latter and the degree of state capture.
Finally, the model is applied to the analysis of the conditions that make it desirable to
grant some form of legal immunity from prosecution to public oﬃcials. This institution,
which is observed in a vast number of countries, makes oﬃcials less accountable and cannot
be explained (as socially desirable) in a model where groups only use bribes as their method
of inﬂuence. Yet, we show that immunity will reduce the degree of state capture when justice
is not very eﬀective. It might seem paradoxical that less accountability would be desirable
when corruption is a concern. But it is the natural outcome when the judicial system is
weak and politically motivated legal actions can allow groups to inﬂuence public oﬃcials.
In summary, we show that the two evils of representative government identiﬁed by John
Stuart Mill in the opening quote of the paper are connected. Thus, and in contrast to the
traditional literature, it is possible to argue that being under the inﬂuence of special interests
will lead to “general ignorance and incapacity, or, to speak more moderately, insuﬃcient
mental qualiﬁcations, in the controlling body”.
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9.1 Appendix 1: Proofs
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 .Since ∂¯ π0
∂β = Φ(h) > 0,al o w e rβ implies a higher degree of state
capture. In addition, from Lemma 2 we have that the quality of the oﬃcial is always w,t h e n
changes in β have no eﬀect on quality.¥
P r o o fo fL e m m a3 .a) The oﬃcial will accept the bribe if w+b−h ≥ w−r.T h e r e f o r e ,
an active pressure group would chose to pay b = h − r, for a given level of threat r.T h e
problem of the active pressure group then becomes,
Max
r Π(b(r),r)=γ{π − βΦ(h − r)} − (1 − γ)ρΨ(r),
which has the following FOC for an interior solution:
γβΦ
0(h − r) − (1 − γ)ρΨ
0(r)=0 . (3)
Since γβΦ0(h) − (1 − γ)ρΨ0(0) > 0, γβΦ0(0) − (1 − γ)ρΨ0(h) < 0 and both Φ0 and Ψ0
are continuous, by the intermediate value theorem, there exists r∗ ∈ (0,h) that satisﬁes the
FOC. In addition the SOC is also satisﬁed:
−γβΦ
00(h − r) − (1 − γ)ρΨ
00(r) < 0.
From b = h − r,w ea l s oh a v et h a tb∗ ∈ (0,h) and both r∗ and b∗ are strictly positive.¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4 . Given that by Lemma 3 r∗ > 0,t h e nr =0is a binding
restriction in the no threat case and Π(b∗,r ∗) > Π(b◦,r =0 ) . Then, γβΦ(h) >γ β Φ(h −
r∗)+( 1− γ)ρΨ(r∗),a n d¯ π0 = βΦ(h) >β Φ(h − r∗)+
(1−γ)
γ ρΨ(r∗)=¯ π.¥
Proof of Lemma 5. a) Diﬀerentiating the ﬁrst order condition from Lemma 3 at r∗




















γβΦ00(h − r∗)+( 1− γ)ρΨ
00(r∗)
,
which is positive given the second order condition from Lemma 3 and Φ0 being positive.





















γβΦ00(h − r∗)+( 1− γ)ρΨ
00(r∗)
,
which is negative given the second order condition from Lemma 3 and Ψ0(r∗) being positive.¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n5 . This follows from diﬀerentiating the threshold ¯ π(β,ρ)=
βΦ(h − r∗)+
(1−γ)
γ ρΨ(r∗) with respect to β and ρ respectively, taking into account that r∗












































P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n6 .a) Let β>β
0. From Proposition 4 we have that ¯ π(β) ≥ ¯ π(β
0)
and there are three cases to consider.
First, the group is active under both β and β
0. Given that, by Lemma 4, the payoﬀ of
the oﬃcial is w−r∗ if the group is active and that by Lemma 5 dr∗
dβ > 0,t h e nP(β
0) >P(β).
Second, the group is inactive under both β and β
0. By Lemma 4 the payoﬀ of the oﬃcial
is w in both cases.
Third, the group is inactive under β but active under β
0.B yL e m m a s2a n d4t h ep a y o ﬀ
of the oﬃcial is w under β and w − r∗ under β
0.S i n c er∗ > 0 by Lemma 3, P(β
0) <P(β).
And changes in the cost of bribes has ambiguous eﬀects on the payoﬀ of the oﬃcial and its
quality.
b) Let ρ>ρ 0.F r o mP r o p o s i t i o n4w eh a v et h a t¯ π(ρ) ≥ ¯ π(ρ0) and there are three cases
to consider.
First, the group is active under both ρ and ρ0. Given that by Lemma 4, the payoﬀ of the
oﬃcial is w − r∗ if the group is active, and that by Lemma 5 dr∗
dρ < 0,t h e nP(ρ) >P(ρ0).
Second, the group is inactive under both ρ and ρ0. By Lemma 2 the payoﬀ of the oﬃcial
is w in both cases.
Third, the group is inactive under ρ but active under ρ0.B yL e m m a s2a n d4t h ep a y o ﬀ
of the oﬃcial is w under β and w − r∗ under β
0.S i n c er∗ > 0 by Lemma 3, P(ρ) >P(ρ0).
Therefore, a reduction on the cost of threats reduces the payoﬀ and quality of the oﬃcial.¥
Proof of Proposition 7. G i v e nt h a ta na c t i v ep r e s s u r eg r o u pw i l lp a yb r i b e sa sl o wa s
possible given the level of punishment we have that
b(i,r)=
[(θw − (1 − θ)r](1 − i)+m
1 − θ(1 − i)
.( 4 )
G i v e nt h a tb r i b e sc a nn o tb en e g a t i v ew eh a v et h a tr ∈ [0,r],w h e r er = θ
1−θw + m
(1−i)(1−θ).






− (1 − γ)ρΨ
0(r
∗)=0 . (5)
Given that the FOC is positive for r =0and negative for r = r,a n db o t hΦ0 and Ψ0 are
continuous, by the intermediate value theorem, there exists r∗ ∈ (0,r) that satisﬁes the FOC.
In addition it can be easily shown that r∗ is continuous in the parameters of the model. (The
SOC can also be easily checked).



























∂i is the direct eﬀect of i on b. Obviously, sgn(d¯ π
di)=sgn(∂b
∂i).D i ﬀerentiating (4)
and rearranging we get ∂b
∂i > 0 iﬀ θ< r∗
w+m+r∗.B u tr e m e m b e rt h a tr∗ depends on θ.S i n c e










is strictly lower than θ for θ close enough to 1. Then, given that r∗ is continuous in θ,t h e r e
exist θ ∈ (0,1) and θ ∈ (0,1) such that θ ≤ θ, ∂b
∂i > 0 for θ<θand ∂b
∂i < 0 for θ>θ.
Therefore d¯ π
di > 0 if θ<θand d¯ π
di < 0 if θ>θ.¥
Proof of Proposition 8. As u ﬃcient condition for higher immunity to improve the
payoﬀ (hence, the ability) of politicians is that dr∗
di < 0.T h e t e r mdr∗
di c a nb eo b t a i n e da s
the ﬁrst order comparative static eﬀect of i on r after writing the FOC for the group in the








































2 − (1 − γ)ρΨ00
,
where the denominator is clearly negative. Thus, the sign of dr∗
di depends on the sign of the




drdi > 0 holds. This can be written
as Φ00 (θ(w+r)−(1−θ)r)(1−θ)(1−i)
(1−θ(1−i))3 +Φ0 (1−θ)
[1−θ(1−i)]2 > 0. This inequality will be satisﬁed if θ ≥ r∗
w+m+r∗.
That is if θ ≥ θ from the proof of Proposition 6.¥
9.2 Appendix 2: The credibility of threats in a repeated game
The standard assumption in the political economy literature is that informal “contracts”
are credible (e.g. Stigler, 1971; Peltzman, 1976; Becker, 1983; and Baron, 1989; inter alia).
30How can the promise of bribes (policy) be made credible if after a policy (bribe) has been
given there is nothing there to enforce this agreement? One might think that sometimes
it is perhaps possible to operate in real time, with an immediate quid pro quo exchange
mechanism. This is just a fancy way of saying that one might pay the bribe with one hand
and get the favor (a signature of a decree, say) on the other, at the same time. It could be
argued that these problems get worse when it comes to threats. One is not necessarily in a
position to deliver a punishment there and then, right after the oﬃcial refuses one’s oﬀer.
One might need to go out and spend time ﬁnding and hiring a thug. Even ﬁnding a journalist
or a judge one can hire might take a positive length of time. And of course spending this
time and money once the oﬃcial has refused to deliver a favor is a dominated strategy. One
usual answer for sustaining the play of dominated strategies is that presumably, in a repeated
interaction, reputational concerns induce players to keep their word. Our concern in this
section is then with whether reputation can help make credible the threats of the group.
Konrad and Skaperdas (1997) study a simple way of generating credibility by sinking a ﬁx
cost in advance. Smith and Varese (2000) look at a two-period model where threats by a
maﬁa are sustained by reputation. In this section we describe a simple inﬁnitely repeated
version of the model in which threats are not assumed to be exogenously credible. For this
environment, we provide conditions under which the optimal threat of previous sections (r∗)
becomes endogenously credible on reputation grounds.
Suppose that the game described in Section 3 takes place between an inﬁnitely lived
pressure group (with discount factor δ<1)a n dad i ﬀerent oﬃcial each period. The other
diﬀerence is that the group can renege on its threat to punish an oﬃcial that does not accept
the bribe. Even when punishment is not committed in advance, the group may be willing to
carry it out if failing to do so would result in future oﬃcials thinking that threats are empty.
Then, failure to deliver punishment would result in the group paying the full bribe in the
future or going inactive because of the reputation loss.
For the pressure group to be willing to punish an oﬃcial with intensity r∗ after the bribe
was rejected, two things are necessary. First, it is necessary that the group makes positive
proﬁts in equilibrium (otherwise there is no sense in having any reputation). Second, the
group must be patient enough for the long run loss of reputation being more important than
the short run cost of punishing an oﬃcial.
Proposition 10 If Π(b∗,r∗) > 0 and the group is suﬃciently patient (δ large enough), then
there exists a subgame perfect equilibrium in which bribes b∗ and threats r∗ are used.
Proof: Consider the following proﬁle of strategies:
a) For the pressure group: (i) Oﬀer (b∗,r∗) in every period and punish oﬃcials who reject
bribes if every oﬃcial who rejected bribes so far has been punished. (ii) If at least one
31oﬃcial who rejected a bribe has not been punished, oﬀer (b◦,r =0 )if Π(b◦,r =0 )> 0 or
stay inactive otherwise.
b) For the oﬃcials: (i) If all oﬃcials that rejected bribes so far have been punished, accept
the bribe if h ≤ b∗ + r∗. (ii) If at least one oﬃcial who rejected bribes previously was not
punished, accept the bribe only if h ≤ b◦.
This proﬁle of strategies is a subgame perfect equilibrium if no player has incentives to
deviate given the other players’ strategies.
It is straightforward to check that the oﬃcials’ strategies are best responses to the group’s
strategy.
Consider a pressure group interested in inﬂuencing the oﬃcials (Π(b∗,r ∗) > 0). It is clear
that if no rejection to takes bribes has gone unpunished it is optimal for the group to oﬀer
(b∗,r ∗) (by Lemma 3). If some rejection has gone unpunished threats are not credible and
t h eb e s tr e s p o n s eo ft h eg r o u pi st oo ﬀer (b◦,r =0 )if Π(b◦,r =0 )> 0 or stay inactive
otherwise.
If an oﬃcial does not accept the bribe, the group would save ρΨ(r) by not delivering pun-
ishment, but that would result in a loss of {Π(b∗,r ∗) − max{0,Π(b◦,r=0 ) }} in every future
period. Then, it is a best response for the pressure group to punish an oﬃcial who rejects
bribes, if this has always been done before, if ρΨ(r) ≤ δ
1−δ {Π(b∗,r∗) − max{0,Π(b◦,r=0 ) }}.
G i v e nt h a tt h er i g h th a n ds i d eo ft h ei n e q u a l i t yc a nb em a d ea r b i t r a r i l yl a r g eb yc h o o s i n gδ
c l o s ee n o u g ht oo n e ,w eh a v et h a ti ti sab e s tr e s p o n s ef o rt h eg r o u pt oc a r r yo u ti t st h r e a t s
if it is patient enough.¥
Threats are credible since paying the cost of punishing allows the group to derive higher
payoﬀs in the future. These higher payoﬀs are due to the fact that threats can still be used
in the future allowing the group to keep on saving on bribes.
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